Chechoslovakia And Hungary :: essays research papers

Why did both Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 rebel against Soviet domination?The causes for such a massive and all-captivating rebellion, which occurred both in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia (1968), originated close to from deep-rooted antagonism towards Soviet domination in the Eastern europium in the post-war era. A continuous political and cultural suppression by Soviet dictatorial policies, obviously linked with scotch constraints, coalesced to make robust insurrections. Short-term reasons are of no less importance in the analysis of these events. In the case of Hungary, Khrushchev&8217s speech on the twentieth Part Congress - which discredited Stalinist rule and encouraged a policy of diversion - played a significant role in the development of Hungarian resistance. While observing events in Czechoslovakia, the role of Dubcek&8217s government should be emphasized, since it was their new program, which raised a significant intensity in Czechs, to aim for a neutral course.One of the main reasons for the conception of a certain alienation process in Hungary was the brink of an economic catastrophe, to which Hungary was brought by its ex-premier Matyas Rakosi in the mid-1950&8217s. Since Hungarian economic developments mirrored those of the Soviet Union, Rakosi alike made a strong emphasis on the build-up of Hungarian atrocious attention at the expense of the rest of the economy. Likewise, Rakosi&8217s successor, Imre Nagy, was to pursue Malenkov&8217s &8216new course&8217, which aimed to divert the country&8217s resources to light industry and seize the imposed collectivization of agriculture.The economic relaxation led to a corresponding intellectual relaxation. Intellectuals began to discuss not only the nature of the changes in Hungarian communism, but also the value of a communistic placement society commenced debating on the possibility of achieving democracy in a Communist state. Nagy&8217s plans were cut short by the fall of his Soviet Protector, Malenkov, in February 1955. Rakosi seized the opportunity to regain leadership over both the state and the party, re-instituting a Stalinist hard line. Nagy gave in without a fight, perhaps because he evaluate Rakosi would fail in his attempt to re-impose ideological conformity. His intuition has not deceived him horror of Rakosi&8217s brutal and repressive regime which executed at least(prenominal) 2000 people and put 200,000 other in prisons and concentration camps was enormous. Masses were wild by the falling living standards, while hated party leaders were comfortably off. However, Nagy could hardly have expected the shake-up in the Soviet block that was to result from Khrushchev&8217s denunciation of Stalin at the 20th troupe Congress in February 1956.